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Abstract
We show how to compress communication in selection protocols, where the goal is to agree
on a sequence of random bits using only a broadcast channel. More specifically, we present a
generic method for converting any selection protocol, into another selection protocol where each
message is short while preserving the same number of rounds, the same output distribution, and
the same resilience to error. Assuming that the output of the protocol lies in some universe of
size M , in our resulting protocol each message consists of only polylog(M,n, d) many bits, where
n is the number of parties and d is the number of rounds. Our transformation works in the
presence of either static or adaptive Byzantine faults.
As a corollary, we conclude that for any poly(n)-round collective coin-flipping protocol, leader
election protocol, or general selection protocols, messages of length polylog(n) suffice (in the
presence of either static or adaptive Byzantine faults).
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1 Introduction
The resource of communication is central in several fields of computer science. We focus on minimiz-
ing this resource for selection protocols. A selection protocol is a protocol over n parties, each having
a private source of randomness, in which the goal of the parties is to agree on a sequence of common
random bits. We focus on the full information model [BL85], where the parties communicate via a
single broadcast channel. There is a global counter which synchronizes parties in between rounds
but they communicate asynchronously withing rounds. A selection protocol is a generalization of
several very well studied problems, including collective coin-flipping and leader election.
The challenge in designing such protocols is that a subset of the parties may be corrupted and
the rest of the parties should nevertheless agree on a random output. We model faulty parties by
a computationally unbounded adversary who controls a subset of parties and whose aim is to bias
the output of the protocol. We assume that once a party is corrupted, the adversary gains complete
control over the party and can send any messages on its behalf, and the messages can depend on
the entire transcript so far. In addition, we allow our adversary to be rushing, i.e., it can schedule
the delivery of the messages within each round. We consider two classes of adversaries: static and
adaptive. A static adversary is an adversary that chooses which parties to corrupt ahead of time,
before the protocol begins. An adaptive adversary, on the other hand, is allowed to choose which
parties to corrupt adaptively in the course of the protocol as a function of the messages seen so
far. We say that a protocol is (statically/adaptively) secure or resilient if it results with a common
random output in the presence of a (statical/adaptive) adversary that corrupts parties.
We study the following question.
Is there a generic way to compress communication in selection protocols, without negatively
affecting the round complexity, fault-tolerance and other resources?
We give a positive answer to this question. Namely, we show how to compress communication in
selection protocols without incurring any cost to the round complexity or the resilience to errors.
More details follow.
A concrete motivation: adaptively-secure coin-flipping. An important distributed task that
was extensively studied in the full information model, is that of collective coin-flipping. In this
problem, a set of n parties use private randomness and are required to generate a common random
bit. The goal of the parties is to jointly output a somewhat uniform bit even in the case that some
of the parties are faulty and controlled by a static (resp. adaptive) adversary whose goal is to bias
the output of the protocol in some direction.
This problem was first formulated and studied by Ben-Or and Linial [BL85]. In the case of
static adversaries, collective coin-flipping is well studied and almost matching upper and lower
bounds are known [Fei99, RSZ02], whereas the case of adaptive adversaries has received much less
attention. Ben-Or and Linial [BL85] showed that the majority protocol (in which each party sends
a uniformly random bit and the output of the protocol is the majority of the bits sent) is resilient to
Θ(
√
n) adaptive corruptions. Furthermore, they conjectured that this protocol is optimal, that is,
they conjectured that any coin-flipping protocol is resilient to at most O(
√
n) adaptive corruptions.
Shortly afterwards, Lichtenstein, Linial and Saks [LLS89] proved the conjecture for protocols in
which each party is allowed to send only one bit. Very recently, Goldwasser, Kalai and Park [GKP15]
proved a different special-case of the aforementioned conjecture: any symmetric (many-bit) one-
round collective coin-flipping protocol1 is resilient to at most O˜(
√
n) adaptive corruptions. Despite
1A symmetric protocol Π is one that is oblivious to the order of its inputs: namely, for any permutation pi : [n]→ [n]
of the parties, it holds that Π(r1, . . . , rn) = Π(rπ(1), . . . , rπ(n)).
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all this effort, proving a general lower bound, or constructing a collective coin-flipping protocol that
is resilient to at least ω(
√
n) adaptive corruptions, remains an intriguing open problem.
The result of [LLS89] suggests that when seeking for a collective coin-flipping protocol that is
resilient to at least ω(
√
n) adaptive corruptions, to focus on protocols that consist of many commu-
nication rounds, or protocols in which parties send long messages. Our main result (Theorem 1.1
below) is that long messages are not needed in adaptively secure coin-flipping protocols with poly(n)
rounds, and messages of length polylog(n) suffice.2 This is true more generally for leader election
protocols, and for selection protocols where the output comes from a universe of size at most quasi-
polynomial in n.
1.1 Our Results
Our main result is that “long” messages are not needed for selection protocols. More specifically,
we show how to convert any selection protocol, whose output comes from a universe of size M ,
into a selection protocol with the same communication pattern3, the same output distribution, the
same security guarantees, and where parties send messages of length ℓ = polylog(M,n, d). Note
that for many well studied distributed tasks, such as coin-flipping, leader election, and more, the
output is from a universe of size at most poly(n), in which case our result says that if we consider
poly(n)-round protocols, then messages of length polylog(n) suffice.
Our results in more detail. Formally, we say that a selection protocol Π is (t, δ, s)-statically
(resp., adaptively) secure if for any adversary A that statically (resp., adaptively) corrupts at most
t = t(n) parties, and any subset S of the output universe such that |S| = s, it holds that∣∣∣Pr [Output of A(Π) ∈ S]− Pr [Output of Π ∈ S]∣∣∣ ≤ δ,
where “Output of A(Π)” means the output of the protocol when executed in the presence of the
adversary A, “Output of Π” means the output of the protocol when executed honestly, and the
probabilities are taken over the internal randomness of the parties. In addition, we say that a
protocol Π simulates a protocol Π′ if the outcomes of the protocols are statistically close (when
executed honestly) and their communication patterns are the same.
Our main result is a generic communication compression theorem which, roughly speaking, states
that (t, δ, s)-statically (resp., adaptively) secure selection protocols do not need “long” messages.
Namely, we show that any secure selection protocol which sends arbitrarily long messages can be
simulated by a protocol which is almost as secure and sends short messages. The loss in security is a
negligible (denoted by negl), namely, asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial function.
Theorem 1.1 (Main theorem— informal). Any (t, δ, s)-statically (resp., adaptively) secure selection
protocol that outputs m bits (or more generally, has an output universe of size 2m), can be simulated
by a (t, δ′, s)-statically (resp., adaptively) secure selection protocol, where δ′ = δ+negl(n) and parties
send messages of length ℓ = m · polylog(n, d).
We note that the transformation in Theorem 1.1 results in a non-uniform protocol, even if the
protocol we started with is uniform. We elaborate on this in Section 1.2.
2Note that if one could show that these polylog(n) bits can be sent bit by bit sequentially, then using the lower
bound of [LLS89], we could obtain that any collective coin flipping protocol in which each player sends O(1) messages
is resilient to at most
√
n · polylog(n) adaptive corruptions. However, in the adaptive setting it is not clear that
security is preserved if messages are sent bit by bit.
3Here, we mean that a party sends a message at round i of the new protocol only if it sends a message at round i
of the original protocol.
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1.2 Overview of Our Techniques
In this section we provide a high-level overview of our main ideas and techniques. First, we observe
that in our model of communication (the full information model where all communication is done
via a broadcast channel) one can assume, without loss of generality, that any selection protocol (in
which parties do not have private inputs except a source of randomness), can be transformed into
a public-coin protocol, in which honest parties’ messages consist only of random bits. This fact is a
folklore, and for the sake of completeness we include a proof sketch of it in Section 4.
Our main result is a generic transformation that converts any public-coin protocol, in which
parties send arbitrarily long messages, into a protocol in which parties send messages of length
m · polylog(n · d), where m is the number of bits the protocol outputs, n is the number of parties
participating in the protocol, and d is the number of communication rounds. The resulting protocol
simulates the original protocol, has the same round complexity, and satisfies the same security
guarantees. Next, we elaborate on how this transformation works.
Suppose for simplicity that in our underlying protocol each message sent is of length L = L(n)
(and thus the messages come from a universe of size 2L), and think of L as being very large. We
convert any such protocol into a new protocol where each message consists of only ℓ bits, where
think of ℓ as being significantly smaller than L. This is done by a priori choosing 2ℓ messages within
the 2L-size universe, and restricting the parties to send messages from this restricted universe. Thus,
now each message is of length ℓ, which is supposedly significantly smaller than L. We note that
a similar approach was taken in [New91] in the context of transforming public randomness into
private randomness in communication complexity, in [GS10] to reduce the number of random bits
needed for property testers, and most recently in [GKP15] to prove a lower bound for coin-flipping
protocols in the setting of strong adaptive adversaries.
A priori, it may seem that such an approach is doomed to fail, since by restricting the honest
parties to send messages from a small universe within the large 2L-size universe, we give the adversary
a significant amount of information about future messages (especially in the multi-round case).
Intuitively, the reason security is not compromised is that there are many possible restrictions, and
it suffices to prove that a few (or only one) of these restrictions is secure. In other words, very
loosely speaking, since we believe that most of the bits sent by honest parties are not “sensitive”,
we believe that it is safe to post some information about each message ahead of time.
For the sake of simplicity, in this overview we focus on static adversaries, and to simplify matters
even further, we assume the adversary always corrupts the first t parties. This simplified setting
already captures the high-level intuition behind our security proof in Section 3.
Let us first consider one-round protocols. Note that for one-round protocols restricting the
message space of honest parties does not affect security at all since we consider rushing adversaries,
who may choose which messages to send based on the content of the messages sent by all honest
parties in that round. Thus, reducing the length of messages is trivial in this case, assuming the set
of parties that the adversary corrupts is predetermined. We mention that even in this extremely
simplified setting, we need ℓ to be linear in m for correctness (“simulation”), i.e., in order to ensure
that the output is distributed correctly.
Next, consider a multi-round protocol Π. We denote by H the restricted message space, i.e.,
H is a subset of the message universe of size 2ℓ, and denote by ΠH the protocol Π, where the
messages are restricted to the set H. Suppose that for any set H there exists an adversary AH that
biases the outcome of ΠH , say towards 0.
4 We show that in this case there exists an adversary A
in the underlying protocol that biases the outcome towards 0. Loosely speaking, at each step the
4Of course, it may be that for different sets H , the adversary AH biases the outcome to a different value. For
simplicity we assume here that all the adversaries bias the outcome towards a fixed message, which we denote by 0.
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adversary A will simulate one of the adversaries AH . More specifically, at any point in the underlying
protocol, the adversary will randomly choose a set H such that the transcript so far is consistent
(i.e., same transcript) with a run of protocol ΠH with the adversary AH , and will simulate the
adversary AH . The main difficulty is to show that with high probability there exists such H (i.e.,
the remaining set of consistent H’s is non-empty). This follows from a counting argument and basic
probability analysis.
In our actual construction, we have a distinct set H of size 2ℓ corresponding to each message of
the protocol. Thus, if the underlying protocol Π has d rounds, and all the parties send a message
in each round, then the resulting (short-message) protocol is associated with d · n sets H1, . . . ,Hd·n
each of size 2ℓ, where the message of the jth party in the ith round is restricted to be in the set Hi,j.
We denote all these sets by a matrix H ∈ ({0, 1}L)d·n×2ℓ , where the row (i, j) of H corresponds to
the set of messages that the jth party can send during the ith round.
Note that there are 2L·2
ℓ·d·n such matrices. Each time an honest party sends a uniformly random
message in Π it reduces the set of consistent matrices by approximately a 2L-factor (with high
probability). Any time the adversary A sends a message, it also reduces the set of consistent
matrices H, since his message is consistent only with some of the adversaries AH , but again a
probabilistic argument can be used to claim that it does not reduce the set of matrices by too
much, and hence, with high probability there always exist matrices H that are consistent with the
transcript so far.
We briefly mention that the analysis in the case of adaptive corruptions follows the same outline
presented above. One complication is that the mere decision of whether to corrupt or not reduces
the set of consistent matrices H. Nevertheless, we argue that many consistent matrices remain.
We emphasize that the above is an over-simplification of our ideas, and the actual proof is more
complex. We refer to Section 3 for more details.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present the notation and basic definitions that are used in this work. For an
integer n ∈ N we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. For a distribution X we denote by x ← X the
process of sampling a value x from the distribution X. Similarly, for a set X we denote by x← X
the process of sampling a value x from the uniform distribution over X. Unless explicitly stated,
we assume that the underlying probability distribution in our equations is the uniform distribution
over the appropriate set. We let UL denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}L. We use log x to
denote a logarithm in base 2.
A function negl : N→ R is said to be negligible if for every constant c > 0 there exists an integer
Nc such that negl(n) < n
−c for all n > Nc.
The statistical distance between two random variables X and Y over a finite domain Ω is defined
as
SD(X,Y )
def
=
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|Pr[X = ω]− Pr[Y = ω]| . (2.1)
The Model
The communication model and distributed tasks. We consider the synchronous model where
a set of n parties P1, . . . ,Pn run protocols. Each protocol consists of rounds in which parties send
messages. We assume the existence of a global counter which synchronizes parties in between rounds
(but they are asynchronous within a round). The parties communicate via a broadcast channel.
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The focus of this work is on selection protocols where parties do not have any private inputs
and their goal is to agree on a sequence of random bits. Examples of such tasks are coin-flipping
protocols, leader election protocols, etc.
Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to public-coin protocols.
Definition 2.1 (Public-coin protocols). A protocol is public-coin if all honest parties’ messages
consist only of uniform random bits.
In Section 4 we argue that the restriction to public-coin protocols is without loss of generality
since in the full information model any selection protocol can be converted into a public-coin one,
without increasing the round complexity and without degrading security (though this transformation
may significantly increase the communication complexity).
The adversarial model. We consider the full information model where it is assumed the adversary
is all powerful, and may see the entire transcript of the protocol. The most common adversarial
model considered in the literature is the Byzantine model, where a bound t = t(n) ≤ n is specified,
and the adversary is allowed to corrupt up to t parties. The adversary can see the entire transcript,
has full control over all the corrupted parties, and can broadcast any messages on their behalf.
Moreover, the adversary has control over the order of the messages sent within each round of the
protocol.5 We focus on the Byzantine model throughout this work.
Within this model, two types of adversaries were considered in the literature: static adversaries,
who need to specify the parties they corrupt before the protocol begins, and adaptive adversaries,
who can corrupt the parties adaptively based on the transcript so far. Our results hold for both
types of adversaries. Throughout this work, we focus on the adaptive setting, since the proof is
more complicated in this setting. In Subsection 3.3 we mention how to modify (and simplify) the
proof for the static setting.
Correctness and security. For any protocol Π and any adversary A, we denote by
out(AΠ | r1, . . . , rn)
the output of the protocol Π when executed with the adversary A, and where each honest party Pi
uses randomness ri.
Let Π be a protocol whose output is a string in {0, 1}m for some m ∈ N. Loosely speaking,
we say that an adversary is “successful” if he manages to bias the output of the protocol to his
advantage. More specifically, we say that an adversary is “successful” if he chooses a predetermined
subset M ⊆ {0, 1}m of some size s, and succeeds in biasing the outcome towards the set M . To this
end, for any set size s, we define
succs(AΠ) def= max
M⊆{0,1}m s.t. |M |=s
succM (AΠ)
def
= max
M⊆{0,1}m s.t. |M |=s
(
Pr
r1,...,rn
[out(AΠ | r1, . . . , rn) ∈M ]− Pr
r1,...,rn
[outΠ(r1, . . . , rn) ∈M ]
)
,
where outΠ(r1, . . . , rn) denotes the outcome of the protocol Π if all the parties are honest, and use
randomness r1, . . . , rn.
Intuitively, the reason we parameterize over the set size s is that we may hope for different
values of succM (AΠ) for sets M of different sizes, since for a large set M it is often the case that
Prr1,...,rn [outΠ(r1, . . . , rn) ∈M ] is large, and hence succM (AΠ) is inevitably small, whereas for small
sets M the value succM (AΠ) may be large.
5Such an adversary is often referred to as “rushing”.
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For example, for coin-flipping protocols (where m = 1 and the outcome is a uniformly random
bit in the case that all parties are honest), often an adversary is considered successful if it biases
the outcome to his preferred bit with probability close to 1, and hence an adversary is considered
successful if succM (AΠ) ≥ 12 − o(1) for either M = {0} or M = {1}, whereas for general selection
protocols (where m is a parameter) one often considers subsets M ⊆ {0, 1}m of size γ · 2m for some
constant γ > 0, and an adversary is considered successful if there exists a constant δ > 0 such that
succM (AΠ) ≥ δ.
Definition 2.2 (Security). Fix any constant δ > 0, any t = t(n) ≤ n, and any n-party protocol
Π whose output is an element in {0, 1}m. Fix any s = s(m). We say that Π is (t, δ, s)-adaptively
secure if for any adversary A that adaptively corrupts up to t = t(n) parties, it holds that
succs(AΠ) ≤ δ.
We note that this definition generalizes the standard security definition for coin-flipping protocols
and selection protocols. We emphasize that our results are quite robust to the specific security
definition that we consider, and we could have used alternative definitions as well. Intuitively, the
reason is that we show how to transform any d-round protocol Π into another d-round protocol with
short messages, that simulates Π (see Definition 2.3 below), where this transformation is independent
of the security definition. Then, in order to prove that the resulting protocol is as secure as the
original protocol Π, we show that if there exists an adversary for the short protocol that manages to
break security according to some definition, then there exists an adversary for Π that “simulates”
the adversary of the short protocol and breaches security in the same way. (See Section 1.2 for more
details, and Section 3 for the formal argument).
Finally, we mention that an analogous definition to Definition 2.2 can be given for static adver-
saries. Our results hold for the static definition as well.
Definition 2.3 (Simulation). Let Π be an n-party protocol with outputs in {0, 1}m. We say that
an n-party protocol Π′ simulates Π if
SD (outΠ, outΠ′) = negl(n),
where outΠ is a random variable that corresponds to the output of protocol Π assuming all parties
are honest, and outΠ′ is a random variable that corresponds to the output of protocol Π
′ assuming
all parties are honest.
Probabilistic Tools
In the analysis we will use the following simple claims.
Claim 2.4. Let k,M ∈ N be two integers. Let U ⊆ {0, 1}k and f : U → [M ]. For every i ∈ [M ],
denote by
αi = Pr
u←U
[f(u) = i] .
Then,
E
u←U
[
αf(u)
] ≥ 1
M
,
and for any ε > 0,
Pr
u←U
[
αf(u) ≥
ε
M
]
≥ 1− ε.
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Proof. We begin with the proof of the first part. By the definition of expectation
E
u←U
[
αf(u)
]
=
∑
u∈U
Pr[U = u] · αf(u) =
M∑
i=1
αi · Pr
u←U
[
αf(u) = αi
] ≥ M∑
i=1
α2i .
This, together with the the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, implies that
E
u←U
[
αf(u)
] ≥ M∑
i=1
α2i =
M∑
i=1
α2i ·
M∑
i=1
(
1√
M
)2
≥
(
M∑
i=1
αi · 1√
M
)2
=
1
M
,
where the last equality follows from the fact that
∑M
i=1 αi = 1.
For the second part, let
B =
{
i ∈ [M ] | αi < ε
M
}
.
Then,
Pr
u←U
[
αf(u) <
ε
M
]
= Pr
u∈U
[f(u) ∈ B] ≤
∑
i∈B
αi ≤ |B| · ε
M
≤ ε,
as desired, where the first inequality follows from the union bound and the definition of αi, the
second inequality follows from the definition of B, and the third inequality follows from the fact
that |B| ≤M .
Definition 2.5 (Entropy). Let X be a random variable with finite support. The (Shannon) entropy
of X is defined as
entropy(X) =
∑
x∈supp(X)
Pr[X = x] · log 1
Pr[X = x]
= E
x←X
[
log
1
Pr[X = x]
]
.
Claim 2.6. Let X be a random variable with domain {0, 1}k. If entropy(X) ≥ k − ε, then
SD(X,Uk) ≤
√
ε
2
,
where Uk is the uniform distribution over k bits, and where SD(X,Uk) denotes the statistical dis-
tance between X and Uk (see Equation (2.1) for the definition of statistical distance).
Proof. The relative entropy (a.k.a. the Kullback-Leibler divergence) between two distributions
D1,D2 ⊆ {0, 1}k is defined as
DKL(D1‖D2) =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
D1(x) · log
(D1(x)
D2(x)
)
.
A well known relation between relative entropy and the statistical distance is known as Pinsker’s
inequality which states that for any two distributions D1,D2 as above, it holds that
SD(D1,D2) ≤
√
ln 2
2
·DKL(D1‖D2). (2.2)
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Thus, it remains to bound the relative entropy of X and Uk. Let px = Prx∈{0,1}k [X = x]. We
get that
DKL(X‖Uk) =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
px · log
(
px · 2k
)
=
∑
x∈{0,1}k
px · (log(px) + k)
= −entropy(X) + k.
Since entropy(X) ≥ k − ε, we get that
DKL(X‖Uk) ≤ −k + ε+ k = ε.
Plugging this into Pinsker’s inequality (see Equation (2.2)), we get that
SD(X,Uk) ≤
√
ln 2
2
· ε ≤
√
ε
2
.
3 Compressing Communication in Distributed Protocols
In this section we show how to transform any n-party d-round t-adaptively secure public-coin
protocol, that outputs messages of length m and sends messages of length L, into an n-party
d-round t-adaptively secure public-coin protocol in which every party sends messages of length
ℓ = m · polylog(n, d).
Throughout this section, we fix µ∗ to be the negligible function defined by
µ∗ = µ∗(n, d) =
(√
ε+ 1− (1− ε)dn
)
· 2dn, (3.1)
and where ε = 2− log
2(dn).
Theorem 3.1. Fix any m = m(n), d = d(n), L = L(n), and any n-party d-round public-coin
selection protocol Π that outputs messages in {0, 1}m and in which all parties send messages of
length L = L(n). Then, for any constant δ > 0, any t = t(n) < n, and any s = s(m), if Π is
(t, δ, s)-adaptively secure then there exists an n-party d-round (t, δ′, s)-adaptively secure public-coin
selection protocol, that simulates Π, where all parties send messages of length ℓ = m · log4(n · d),
and where δ′ ≤ δ + µ∗ (and µ∗ = µ∗(n, d) is the negligible function defined in Equation (3.1)).
Proof. Fix any m = m(n), d = d(n), L = L(n), and any n-party d-round public-coin protocol Π
that outputs messages in {0, 1}m and in which all parties send messages of length L = L(n). Fix
any constant δ > 0, any t = t(n) < n, and any s = s(m) such that Π is (t, δ, s)-adaptively secure.
We start by describing the construction of the (short message) protocol. Let
N = 2ℓ = 2m·log
4(n·d). (3.2)
Let
H = {H : [d · n]× {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}L}
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be the set all possible [d ·n]×{0, 1}ℓ ≡ [d ·n]× [N ] matrices, whose elements are from {0, 1}L. Note
that |H| = 2d·n·N ·L. We often interpret H : [d · n]× {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}L as a function
H : [d]× [n]× {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}L,
or as a matrix where each row is described by a pair from [d]× [n]. We abuse notation and denote
by
H(i, j, r)
def
= H((i− 1)n+ j, r).
As a convention, we denote by R a message from {0, 1}L and by r and a message from {0, 1}ℓ.
From now on, we assume for the sake of simplicity of notation, that in protocol Π, in each round,
all the parties send a message. Recall that we also assume for the sake of simplicity (and without
loss of generality) that Π is a public-coin protocol (see Definition 2.1). For any H ∈ H we define a
protocol ΠH that simulates the execution of the protocol Π, as follows.
The Protocol ΠH . In the protocol ΠH , for every i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [n], in the ith round, party Pj
sends a random string ri,j ← {0, 1}ℓ. We denote the resulting transcript in round i by
TransH,i = (ri,1, . . . , ri,n) ∈
(
{0, 1}ℓ
)n
,
and denote the entire transcript by
TransH = (TransH,1 . . . ,TransH,d).
We abuse notation, and define for every round i ∈ [d],
H(TransH,i) = (H(i, 1, ri,1), . . . ,H(i, n, ri,n)).
Similarly, we define
H(TransH) = (H(TransH,1) . . . ,H(TransH,d)).
The outcome of protocol ΠH with transcript TransH is defined to be the outcome of protocol Π with
transcript H(TransH).
It is easy to see that the round complexity of ΠH (for every H ∈ H) is the same as that of Π.
Moreover, we note that with some complication in notation we could have also preserved the exact
communication pattern (instead of assuming that in each round all parties send a message).
In order to prove Theorem 1.1 it suffices to prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a subset H0 ⊆ H of size |H|2 , such that for every matrix H ∈ H0 it holds
that ΠH is (t, δ
′, s)-adaptively secure for δ′ = δ + µ∗, where µ∗ is the negligible function defined in
Equation (3.1).
Lemma 3.3. There exists a negligible function µ = µ(n, d) such that,
Pr
H←H
[SD(outΠH , outΠ) ≤ µ] ≥
2
3
.
Indeed, given Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, we obtain that there exists an H ∈ H such that ΠH is
(t, δ′, s)-adaptively secure and it simulates Π.
In Section 3.1 we give the proof of Lemma 3.3 and in Section 3.2 we give the proof of Lemma 3.2.
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3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3
By the definition of statistical distance, in order to prove Lemma 3.3 it suffices to prove that there
exists a negligible function µ = µ(n, d) such that,
Pr
H←H
[
∀z ∈ {0, 1}m, |Pr[outΠH = z]− Pr[outΠ = z]| ≤
µ
2m
]
≥ 2
3
.
Note that
Pr
H←H
[
∀z ∈ {0, 1}m, |Pr[outΠH = z]− Pr[outΠ = z]| ≤
µ
2m
]
=
1− Pr
H←H
[
∃z ∈ {0, 1}m, |Pr[outΠH = z]− Pr[outΠ = z]| >
µ
2m
]
≥
1−
∑
z∈{0,1}m
Pr
H←H
[
|Pr[outΠH = z]− Pr[outΠ = z]| >
µ
2m
]
.
Therefore, it suffices to prove that there exists a negligible function µ such that for every z ∈ {0, 1}m,
Pr
H←H
[
|Pr[outΠH = z]− Pr[outΠ = z]| >
µ
2m
]
≤ 1
3 · 2m .
To this end, for any z ∈ {0, 1}m, we denote by pz = Pr[outΠ = z] and pz,H = Pr[outΠH = z].
Using this notation, it suffices to prove that there exists a negligible function µ such that for every
z ∈ {0, 1}m,
Pr
H←H
[
|pz,H − pz| > µ
2m
]
≤ 1
3 · 2m .
For any H ∈ H, consider the experiment, where we run the protocol ΠH independently B =
2m·log
3(nd) times, and check how many times the output is z. Denote by X1, . . . ,XB the identically
distributed random variables, where Xi = 1 if in the i
th run of the protocol the outcome is z, and
Xi = 0 otherwise. The Chernoff bound
6 implies that for every H ∈ H and for every γ > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − pz,H
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
]
≤ e− γ
2·B
3 .
In particular, setting γ = 2−m·log
2(nd) we deduce that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − pz,H
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
]
≤ e−2m·log
2(nd)
. (3.3)
We next define random variables Y1, . . . , YB as follows: We run the protocol Π independently B
times, and we set Yi = 1 if in the i
th run the outcome is z, and otherwise we set Yi = 0. We note
that the same argument used to deduce Equation (3.3) can be used to deduce that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Yi − pz
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
]
≤ e−2m·log
2(nd)
. (3.4)
6The Chernoff bound states that for any identical and independent random variables X1, . . . , XB , such that Xi ∈
{0, 1} for each i, if we denote by p = E[Xi] then Pr[
∣
∣
∣ 1B
∑B
i=1 Xi − p
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ] ≤ e−
δ
2
3
B .
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Note that,
Pr [|pz,H − pz| > 4γ] ≤
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣pz,H − 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − 1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Yi − pz
∣∣∣∣∣ > 4γ
]
≤
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣pz,H − 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > γ
]
+ Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − 1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2γ
]
+ Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Yi − pz
∣∣∣∣∣ > γ
]
≤
2 · e−2m·log
2(nd)
+ Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − 1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2γ
]
,
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, the second inequality follows from the
union bound, and the third inequality follows from Equations (3.3) and (3.4). Thus, it suffices to
prove that there exists a negligible function µ = µ(n, d) such that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − 1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2γ
]
≤ µ
2m
.
To this end, notice that for a random H ←H,
SD ((X1, . . . ,XB) , (Y1, . . . , YB)) ≤
B∑
i=1
SD ((X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi, Yi+1, . . . , YB) , (X1, . . . ,Xi−1, Yi, Yi+1, . . . , YB)) =
B∑
i=1
SD ((X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi) , (X1, . . . ,Xi−1, Yi)) ≤
B · SD ((X1, . . . ,XB−1,XB) , (X1, . . . ,XB−1, YB)) ≤
B · nd · (B − 1)nd
Nnd
≤
B2 · nd
N
≤
22m log
3(nd) · nd
2m log
4(nd)
≤
2−m log
3(nd),
where the first equation follows from a standard hybrid argument. The second equation follows from
the fact that Yi+1, . . . , YB are independent of X1, . . . ,Xi, Yi. The third equation follows from the
fact that the statistical distance between (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi) and (X1, . . . ,Xi−1, Yi) is maximal for
i = B. The forth equation follows from the fact that (X1, . . . ,XB−1,XB) and (X1, . . . ,XB−1, YB)
are identically distributed if the following event, which we denote by Good, occurs: Recall that
each Xi depends only on nd random coordinates of H ← H. We say that Good occurs if the nd
coordinates that XB depends on are disjoint from all the nd(B − 1) coordinates that X1, . . . ,XB−1
depend on. The forth equation follows from the fact that Pr[¬Good] ≤ nd · (B−1)nd
Nnd
. The rest of the
equations follow from basic arithmetics and from the definition of B and N .
In particular, this implies that
SD
((
1
B
B∑
i=1
Xi
)
,
(
1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
))
≤ 2−m log3(nd). (3.5)
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Consider the algorithm D that given p′z, supposedly distributed according to 1B
∑B
i=1Xi or dis-
tributed according to 1
B
∑B
i=1 Yi, outputs 1 if |p′z−pz| ≤ γ, and otherwise outputs 0. Equation (3.4)
implies that
Pr
[
D
(
1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
)
= 1
]
≥ 1− e−2m·log
2(nd)
.
This together with Equation (3.5), implies that
Pr
[
D
(
1
B
B∑
i=1
Xi
)
= 1
]
≥ 1− e−2m·log
2(nd) − 2−m log3(nd) ≥ 1− 2−m log2(nd),
which by the definition of D, implies that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − pz
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ
]
≥ 1− 2−m log2(nd).
This, in particular, implies that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1B
B∑
i=1
Xi − 1
B
B∑
i=1
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2γ
]
≥ 1− 2 · 2−m log2(nd),
as desired.
3.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Assume towards contradiction that for every set H0 ⊆ H of size |H|2 there exists H ∈ H0 such that
ΠH is not (t, δ
′, s)-adaptively secure, for δ′ = δ+ µ∗. This implies that there exists a set H0 ⊆ H of
size |H|2 such that for every H ∈ H0 there exists an adversary AH that adaptively corrupts at most t
parties and satisfies
succs(
(AH)
ΠH
) ≥ δ′.
This, in turn, implies that there exists a set M ⊆ {0, 1}m of size s > 0 such that for at least
1/
(2m
s
)
-fraction of the H’s in H0 the adversary AH satisfies that succM (
(AH)
ΠH
) ≥ δ′. We denote
this set of H’s by H1. Notice that
|H1| ≥ |H0|(2m
s
) = |H|
2 · (2m
s
) ≥ |H|
22m
= 2dnNL−2
m
. (3.6)
The proof proceeds as follows: we show how to use these adversaries {AH}H∈H1 to construct an
adversary A such that
succM (AΠ) ≥ δ′ − µ∗/2 = δ + µ∗ − µ∗/2 > δ,
contradicting the (t, δ, s)-adaptive security of Π.
The idea is for the adversary A to simulate the execution of one of the AH ’s. The problem is
that we do not know ahead of time which H will be consistent with the transcript of the protocol,
since we have no control over the (long) random messages of the honest parties. We overcome this
problem by choosing H adaptively. Namely, at any point in the protocol, A simulates a random
adversary AH , where H is a random matrix that is consistent (in some sense that we explain later)
with the transcript up to that point.
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More specifically, for every i ∈ [d] and every j ∈ [n], we denote by Hi,j−1 the set of matrices that
are consistent with the transcript up until the point where the jth message of the ith round is about
to be sent. Fix any round i ∈ [d] and any j ∈ [n]. Roughly speaking, in the ith round before the jth
message is to be sent, the adversary A simulates AH∗ where H∗ ← Hi,j−1 is chosen uniformly at
random. If AH∗ corrupts a party Pu then A also corrupts Pu. If AH∗ sends a message r∗i on behalf
of a corrupted party Pu, then A will send the message R∗i = H∗(i, u, r∗i ) on behalf of party Pu. In
this case, we define Hi,j to be all the matrices in Hi,j−1 which are consistent with the transcript
so far and agree with H∗ on row (i, u). If AH∗ asks an honest party Pu to send its message, the
adversary A will also ask honest party Pu to send a message. Upon receiving a message R∗ from
Pu, we choose a random matrix H ← Hi,j−1 that is consistent with the transcript so far, and set
Hi,j to be all the matrices in Hi,j−1 that are consistent with the transcript so far, and where we fix
the (i, u) row to be the (i, u) row of H.
Before giving the precise description of the adversary A, we provide some useful notation. We
denote the transcript generated in an execution of the protocol Π with an adversary A by TransA.
Note that TransA consists of d vectors (one per each round), where each vector consists of n pairs
of the form
((Pj1 ,R1), . . . , (Pjn ,Rn)),
where R1, . . .Rn ∈ {0, 1}L and j1, . . . , jn ∈ [n], where the order means that in this round party
Pj1 sent his message first, then party Pj2 sent his message, and so on (recall that in our model,
the adversary has control over the scheduling of the messages within each round). We sometimes
consider a partial transcript Transi,j (i.e., a prefix of a transcript) which corresponds to a partial
execution of the protocol Π with the adversary A until after the jth message in the ith round was
sent. For H ∈ H, we denote by
MAPH : [d]× [n]× {0, 1}L → {0, 1}ℓ ∪ {⊥}
the mapping that takes as input a row number (i, j) ∈ [d]× [n] and a (long) message in R ∈ {0, 1}L,
and converts it into a (short) message r ∈ {0, 1}ℓ such that H(i, j, r) = R. If no such message exists,
MAPH outputs ⊥.
Let Transi,j be a (long) partial transcript of Π. The corresponding (short) transcript of ΠH ,
denoted by MAPH(Transi,j), is defined recursively, as follows. Let Transi,j = (Transi,j−1, (Pu,R)).
Then,
MAPH(Transi,j) =
(
MAPH(Transi,j−1), (Pu,MAPH(i, u,R))
)
.
We initialize Trans1,0 = ∅ and H1,0 = H1. Using this notation, a formal description of the adversary
A is given in Figure 1.
In order to prove Lemma 3.2 (and thus to complete the proof of Theorem 1.1), it suffices to
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. The adversary A makes at most t adaptively-chosen corruptions, and succM (AΠ) ≥
δ′ − µ∗/2.
Proof. We first note that A always makes at most t corruptions. This follows from the fact that A
is always consistent with some adversary AH , for some H ∈ H1 (or else A aborts), and by our
assumption, every AH makes at most t corruptions.
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The adversary A(Transi,j−1) before the j
th message of round i
1. If Hi,j−1 = ∅, output ⊥ and HALT.
2. Choose H∗ ← Hi,j−1 uniformly at random. Let TransH∗ = MAPH∗(Transi,j−1) denote the
(short) transcript in the protocol ΠH∗ that corresponds to the (long) transcript Transi,j−1.
3. If AH∗(TransH∗) corrupts a party Pu then corrupt Pu.
4. If AH∗(TransH∗) sends a message on behalf of a corrupt party Pu, then do the following:
(a) Denote by r∗ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ the message that AH∗(TransH∗) sends on behalf of Pu. Let
R∗ = H∗(i, u, r∗).
(b) Send the message R∗ on behalf of party Pu.
(c) Add (Pu,R
∗) to the partial transcript. Namely, set
Transi,j = (Transi,j−1, (Pu,R
∗)) .
(d) Define Hi,j to be the set of all H ∈ Hi,j−1 that are consistent with the transcript so far,
and for which H(i, u, ·) = H∗(i, u, ·). Namely, set
Hi,j =
{
H ∈ Hi,j−1 | ∀r : H(i, u, r) = H∗(i, u, r), and
AH(TransH) sends r∗ on behalf of Pu,
where TransH = MAPH(Transi,j−1)
}
.
5. If AH∗(TransH∗) does not corrupt, and orders an honest party Pu to send a message, then do
the following:
(a) Do not corrupt, and order honest party Pu to send a message. Denote the message it
sends by R∗.
(b) Add (Pu,R
∗) to the partial transcript. Namely, set
Transi,j = (Transi,j−1, (Pu,R
∗)).
(c) Choose a random matrix
H ′ ← {H ∈ Hi,j−1 | AH(TransH) orders honest Pu to send a message, and
∃r s.t. H(i, u, r) = R∗}.
(d) Define Hi,j to be the set of all H ∈ Hi,j−1 that are consistent with the transcript so far,
and agree with H ′ on row (i, u). That is,
Hi,j = {H ∈ Hi,j−1 | ∀r : H(i, u, r) = H ′(i, u, r), and
AH(TransH) orders honest Pu to send a message}.
6. If j = n, set Hi+1,0 = Hi,j and Transi+1,0 = Transi,j.
Algorithm 1: The adversary A before the jth message of round i.
We next prove that succM (AΠ) ≥ δ′ − µ∗/2. Recall that we denote by TransA the random
variable that corresponds to the transcript generated by running the protocol Π with the adversary A
(described in Figure 1).
Let Transideal be an “ideal” transcript, generated as follows: Choose a random H ←H1, run the
protocol ΠH with the adversary AH . Denote the resulting transcript by TransH . As above, TransH
consists of d vectors (one per each round), where each vector consists of n pairs of the form
((Pj1 , r1), . . . , (Pjn , rn)),
where r1, . . . rn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and j1, . . . , jn ∈ [n]. We define
Transideal = H(TransH)
where H(TransH) is the transcript obtained by applying H(i, u, ·) to each element in the (i, u)th row
of TransH . Formally, H(TransH) is defined recursively, as follows: For every i ∈ [d] and every j ∈ [n],
we let TransH,i,j denote the transcript TransH up until after the j
th message in the ith round is sent.
We define H(TransH,i,j) recursively, as follows: For TransH,i,j = (TransH,i,j−1, (Pu, r)), we define
H(TransH,i,j) = (H(TransH,i,j−1), (Pu,H(i, u, r))).
In order to prove Lemma 3.4 it suffices to prove the following claim.
Claim 3.5.
SD(TransA,Transideal) = µ
∗/2,
Proof. We prove Claim 3.5 using a hybrid argument. Specifically, we define a sequence of d · (n+1)
experiments. For every i ∈ [d] and every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, we define the experiment Exp(i,j) as
follows:
1. Generate Transi,j and Hi,j, as defined in Figure 1.
2. Choose a random H ←Hi,j, and let TransH,i,j = MAPH(Transi,j).
3. Run the protocol ΠH with the adversary AH , given the partial transcript TransH,i,j. Namely,
run ΠH withAH from after the jth message in the ith round was sent, and assume the transcript
up until that point is TransH,i,j. Denote the entire transcript (including TransH,i,j) by TransH .
4. Output H(TransH).
Notice that
Exp(d,n) ≡ TransA,
and
Exp(1,0) ≡ Transideal.
It remains to argue that for every i ∈ [d] and every j ∈ [n] the statistical distance between any
two consecutive experiments Exp(i,j−1) and Exp(i,j) is small. In particular, it suffices to prove that
SD
(
Exp(i,j−1),Exp(i,j)
)
=
µ∗
2dn
. (3.7)
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The reason is that given this inequality, we obtain that
SD(TransA,Transideal) ≤
∑
i∈[d],j∈[n]
SD(Exp(i,j−1),Exp(i,j)) ≤ d · n · µ
∗
2dn
=
µ∗
2
,
which completes the claim. We note that the first inequality follows from the union bound together
with the fact that Exp(i,n) = Exp(i+1,0) for every i ∈ [d− 1] (see Figure 1 Item 6).
We proceed with the proof of Equation (3.7). To this end, fix any i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [n]. Let
k
def
= (i − 1) · d + j. Note that in both Expi,j−1 and Expi,j the first k − 1 messages are generated
according to TransA.
Denote by corruptk the event that the k
th message is sent by a corrupted party. We first argue
that
Pr
[
corruptk | Exp(i,j−1)
]
= Pr
[
corruptk | Exp(i,j)
]
.
This follows immediately from the definition of the two experiments. In Exp(i,j) (according to
Figure 1, Items 2-4), before sending the kth message, a random function is chosen H∗ ←Hi,j−1 and
the kth message is sent by a corrupted party if and only if AH∗ chooses the kth message to be sent
by a corrupted party (given the transcript so far). Note that in Exp(i,j−1), the same exact process
occurs (see Items 2 to 4 at the beginning of the proof of Claim 3.5).
We next argue
SD
((
Exp(i,j−1) | corruptk
)
,
(
Exp(i,j) | corruptk
))
= 0. (3.8)
To see why Equation (3.8) holds, note that according to Figure 1 (see Items 2 to 4), the kth message
in
(
Exp(i,j) | corruptk
)
is chosen by sampling a random matrix H∗ ←Hi,j−1 conditioned on the fact
that the kth message sent in ΠH∗ with AH∗ is sent by a corrupted party. Denote this corrupted
party by Pu and denote by r
∗ the message that AH∗ sends on behalf of Pu. Then the kth message in
Exp(i,j) is set to be H∗(i, u, r∗). Note that the kth message in Exp(i,j−1) is chosen in exactly the same
way (see Items 2 to 4 at the beginning of the proof of Claim 3.5). Moreover, the distribution of the
set Hi,j in both cases is identical, which implies that the distributions of the rest of the messages in(
Exp(i,j−1) | corruptk
)
and in
(
Exp(i,j) | corruptk
)
are identical as well.
It remains to prove that
SD
((
Exp(i,j−1) | ¬corruptk
)
,
(
Exp(i,j) | ¬corruptk
))
=
µ∗
2dn
. (3.9)
Recall that in
(
Exp(i,j) | ¬corruptk
)
the kth message is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}L. Denote
by R′ the kth message in
(
Exp(i,j−1) | ¬corruptk
)
. Recall that R′ is distributed as follows: Choose
a random H ← Hi,j−1 such that the adversary A (given the partial transcript MAPH(Transi,j−1))
orders an honest party Pu to send the j
th message in the ith round. Choose a random r′ ← {0, 1}ℓ,
and and set R′ = H(i, u, r′).
Notice that in order to prove Equation (3.9), it suffices to prove that
SD(R′,UL) =
µ∗
2dn
. (3.10)
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Recall that we fixed ε = 2− log
2(dn). We argue that in order to prove Equation (3.10) it suffices
to prove that,
Pr
[
|Hi,j−1| ≥ 2
dnNL
2(k−1)NL · (4nN
ε
)k−1 · 22m
]
≥ (1− ε)k−1, (3.11)
where the probability is over the randomness of the honest parties.
To this end, suppose that Inequality (3.11) holds. Denote by E the event that
|Hi,j−1| ≥ 2
dnNL
2(k−1)NL · (4nN
ε
)k−1 · 22m . (3.12)
By Inequality (3.11),
Pr[E] ≥ (1− ε)k−1.
Therefore,
SD(R′,UL) ≤
SD((R′ | E),UL) · Pr[E] + SD((R′ | ¬E),UL) · Pr[¬E] ≤
SD((R′ | E),UL) + Pr[¬E] ≤
SD((R′ | E),UL) + 1− (1− ε)k−1.
This, together with the definition of µ∗ (see Equation (3.1)), implies that in order to prove Equa-
tion (3.10) it suffices to prove that
SD((R′ | E),UL) ≤
√
ε.
This, together with Claim 2.6, implies that it suffices to prove that
entropy(R′ | E) ≥ L− ε. (3.13)
To this end, let H ←Hi,j−1. Then,
entropy(H | E) ≥
dnNL− (k − 1)NL− (k − 1)(log 4nN)− (k − 1) log 1
ε
− 2m =
(dn − k + 1)NL− (k − 1)
(
log 4nN + log
1
ε
)
− 2m,
where the first inequality follows from Equation (3.12) together with the definition of entropy (see
Definition 2.5), and the latter equality follows from basic arithmetics.
For every α ∈ [d] and every β ∈ [n], we denote by Rowα,β ∈ {0, 1}NL the random variable
obtained by choosing a random matrix H ←Hi,j−1, and setting Rowα,β to be the (α, β)th row of H.
Note that
entropy(H | E) ≤
∑
α∈[d],β∈[n]
entropy(Rowα,β | E) ≤ entropy(Rowi,u | E) +NL(dn − k),
where the first inequality follows from the basic property of Shannon entropy, that for any random
variables X and Y , it holds that entropy(X,Y ) ≤ entropy(X) + entropy(Y ), and the second equality
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follows from the fact that k − 1 of the rows in Hi,j−1 are fixed. This, together with the equations
above, implies that
entropy(Rowi,u | E) ≥
(dn− k + 1)NL− (k − 1)
(
log 4nN + log
1
ε
)
− 2m −NL(dn− k) =
NL− (k − 1)
(
log 4nN + log
1
ε
)
− 2m =
NL− (k − 1) (log 4nN + log2(dn))− 2m.
Recall that (R′ | E) is the random variable defined by choosing H ← Hi,j−1 (where we assume
that event E holds for Hi,j−1), choosing a random α← [N ], and setting R′ = H(i, u, α). Thus,
entropy(R′ | E) ≥
NL− (k − 1)(log 4nN + log2(dn))− 2m
N
=
L− (k − 1)(log 4nN + log
2(dn)) + 2m
N
≥
L− ε,
proving Equation (3.13), where the latter inequality follows from the definition of N (see Equa-
tion (3.2)).
It remains to prove Inequality (3.11). We prove that Inequality (3.11) holds for any (i, j) ∈
[d] × {0, 1, . . . , n}. The proof is by induction on k = (i − 1) · n + j. The base case is k = 0, which
corresponds to (i, j) = (1, 0). In this case, it is always holds that
|Hi,j| = |H1,0| = |H1| ≥ 2
dnNL
22m
,
where the latter inequality follows from the definition of H1 (see Equation (3.6)).
Next, assume that Inequality (3.11) holds for k− 1, and we prove that it holds for k. Fix i ∈ [d]
and j ∈ [n] such that k = (i− 1) · n+ j. By the induction hypothesis,
Pr
[
|Hi,j−1| ≥ 2
dnNL
2(k−1)NL · (4nN
ε
)k−1 · 22m
]
≥ (1− ε)k−1.
We denote by E the event that indeed
|Hi,j−1| ≥ 2
dnNL
2(k−1)NL · (4nN
ε
)k−1 · 22m .
Thus, by our induction hypothesis,
Pr[E] ≥ (1− ε)k−1.
In what follows, fix any Hi,j−1 such that event E holds. Claim 2.4 (with U = Hi,j−1 and
M = 2NL · 4nN) implies that
Pr
[
|Hi,j| ≥ |Hi,j−1|
2NL · 4nN
ε
]
≥ 1− ε.
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This, in turn, implies that
Pr
[
|Hi,j| ≥ 2
dnNL
2kNL · (4nN
ε
)k · 22m
]
≥
Pr
[
|Hi,j| ≥ 2
dnNL
2kNL · (4nN
ε
)k · 22m | E
]
· Pr[E] ≥
Pr
[
|Hi,j| ≥ |Hi,j−1|
2NL · 4nN
ε
| E
]
· Pr[E] ≥
(1− ε) · (1− ε)k−1 =
(1− ε)k,
as desired.
3.3 Static Adversaries
We note that Theorem 3.1 holds also for static adversary. For completeness, we restate the theorem
for static adversaries.
Theorem 3.6. Fix any m = m(n), d = d(n), L = L(n), and any n-party d-round public-coin
protocol Π that outputs messages in {0, 1}m and in which all parties send messages of length L =
L(n). Then, for any constant δ > 0, any t = t(n) < n, and any s = s(m), if Π is (t, δ, s)-
statically secure then there exists an n-party d-round (t, δ′, s)-statically secure public-coin protocol
that simulates Π, where all parties send messages of length ℓ = m · log4(n ·d), and where δ′ ≤ δ+µ∗
(where µ∗ is the negligible function defined in Equation (3.1)).
The proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 3.1 except that in the static setting, the
adversary A needs to decide which t parties to corrupt before the protocol begins.
Recall that in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the adversary A simulates one of the adversaries AH .
In the static setting, the adversary A will choose to corrupt the t parties that are consistent with
as many AH as possible. More specifically, recall that in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we defined H1
to be the set of all matrices H such that AH tries to bias the outcome towards a specific set M .
Recall that |H1| ≥ |H|22m .
In the static setting, for every H ∈ H1 we denote by TH the set of parties that the adversary
AH corrupts. For every set T ⊆ [n] of size t let
α(T ) =
∣∣{H ∈ H1 : TH = T}∣∣ .
We define
T ∗ = argmax
T
{α(T )},
and the adversary A corrupts the set of parties T ∗. We define H′1 ⊆ H1 to consist of all the matrices
H ∈ H1 for which AH corrupts the set of parties T ∗. Note that∣∣H′1∣∣ ≥ |H1|2n ≥ |H|22m · 2n .
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1, except that the analysis is easier in the
static setting, since the decision of who to corrupt has already been made.
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4 Public-Coin Protocols
In this section we show how to convert any selection protocol into a public-coin protocol.
Theorem 4.1. Every selection protocol Π can be transformed into a protocol Π′ which simulates Π
and such that the messages sent in Π′ are uniformly random. Moreover, the protocol Π′ preserves
the security of Π and its round complexity.
Proof Sketch. Let Π be an n-party selection protocol. Let d = d(n) be the number of commu-
nication rounds and let us assume for simplicity that each party speaks at each round. Assume,
without loss of generality, that each party samples its own randomness ahead of time, when the
protocol begins. That is, for every j ∈ [n], party Pj has randomness rj ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, where we let ℓ
be the maximum number of random bits used by all parties during the protocol. At each round i,
party Pj evaluates a function fi,j which depends on the transcript of the protocol so far, which we
denote by Transi−1 (i.e., Transi−1 are the messages sent by all parties in rounds 1, . . . , i− 1), and on
its own randomness rj. Namely, the message sent at round i ∈ [d] by party Pj is
mi,j = fi,j(Transi−1, rj).
Before we define the protocol Π′, we introduce some notation. We say that a random string r
is good with respect to transcript Transi and party Pj if when it is used as the randomness of that
party, it generates the same exact transcript.
Next, we define the protocol Π′. In round i ∈ [d], party Pj sends a uniformly random string ui,j
of length 2ℓ · ℓ. Specifically, each party sends a uniformly random permutation of all possible ℓ-bit
strings. At the end, after the dth round ends, we interpret each ui,j as a collection of many possible
random strings for party Pj , choose one (say the first), denoted by ri,j, which is good with respect
to the transcript so far and think of the (i, j)th message as fi,j(Transi−1, ri,j).
First, we observe that the round complexity of Π′ is the same as that of Π. Next, we claim that
in an honest execution (i.e., in the absence of an adversary), the distribution of the output of the
protocol Π is identical to that of Π′ (namely, Π′ simulates Π). We first note that conditioned on
the fact that a good randomness was found for all d · n messages, the above distributions are the
same. This is true since in Π′ each party sends all possible ℓ bit strings in a uniformly random order.
Second, we note that, since each party sends all possible ℓ-bit strings in each round, there always
exists good randomness.
Next, we argue that the protocol Π′ is as secure as Π. This follows by a simple hybrid argument.
We define a sequence of protocols Π(i) for i ∈ {0, . . . , dn} in which until (and including) the ith
message, the parties act according to Π and in the rest of the protocol they act according to Π′.
Notice that Π′ ≡ Π(0) and Π ≡ Π(dn). We argue that for every i ∈ [dn], the “advantage” of any A(i)
in Π(i) over any A(i−1) in Π(i−1) is zero.
To this end, observe that the first i − 1 messages are distributed exactly the same. In the next
message (i.e., the ith one) the protocols deviate. Assume party Pj speaks in both. While in Π
(i) the
message sent is some function of the transcript so far and the initial randomness Pj has, in Π
(i−1) it
is a random permutation of all possible random strings. We first note that if party Pj is corrupted,
then both the adversary A(i) and A(i−1) can force any message in the name of Pj and thus they
have the same power in both protocols (recall that after the ith message, the protocols are identical).
Hence, assume that Pj is not corrupted. In this case, the adversary A(i) sees a message which is
a function of the transcript up to that point and the (private) randomness of that party, whereas
A(i−1) sees a message which is a random permutation of all possible random strings. The theorem
now follows by observing that one adversary can simulate the view of the other, and recalling that
the rest of the messages in both protocols are identically distributed.
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